The Dignity of the Human Person: Catholic Social Teaching and the Practice of Criminal Punishment by Klein, Dora W
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University 
Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship 
2014 
The Dignity of the Human Person: Catholic Social Teaching and 
the Practice of Criminal Punishment 
Dora W. Klein 
St. Mary's University School of Law, dklein@stmarytx.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dora W. Klein, The Dignity of the Human Person: Catholic Social Teaching and the Practice of Criminal 
Punishment, 60 Loy. L. Rev. 1 (2014). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital 
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact 
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu. 
ARTICLES
THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON:
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE
PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
Dora W. Klein*
IN TR O D U CTIO N ......................................................................... 1
I. THE FOUNDATION: CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO THE
DEATH PENALTY ........................................................... 2
II. BEYOND THE DEATH PENALTY ........................................ 9
A. FROM DESERT TO VENGEANCE ......................................... 10
B. RELIANCE ON IMPRISONMENT ...................................... 13
C. ACCEPTANCE OF BRUTALITY .......................................... 17
III. REFORMATION AND REDEMPTION .............................. 23
CO N CLU SIO N ............................................................................ 31
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the Catholic Church has
become an influential voice in the public debate about the death
penalty. Pope John Paul II began in earnest to try to change
what he called the "culture of death," which he identified as
including the death penalty.1 In the United States, the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops has faithfully campaigned against
the death penalty, with press releases, special reports, and
amicus briefs.2 Sister Helen Prejean, who wrote Dead Man
* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. J.D., Vanderbilt University
Law School; M.A. (Psychology), University of Pennsylvania; B.A., Swarthmore
College. For helpful comments and conversations, the author thanks Michael Ariens,
Colin Marks, and Reynaldo Valencia. Responsibility for all errors is, of course, the
author's alone.
1. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE
(EVANGELIUM VITAE) 12, 27-28 (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
2. Many of these resources are collected at Death Penalty/Capital Punishment,
U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-
and-dignity/death-penalty-capital-punishment/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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Walking-the popular nonfiction book that became a popular
movie-is in some sense the "face" of the anti-death penalty
movement.3
The moral foundation that supports the Catholic Church's
opposition to the death penalty is wide and deep. This Article
proposes that despite the oft-repeated maxim that "death is
different, 4 the same foundation that supports efforts to abolish
the death penalty can also support those who seek to achieve
other reforms in the practice of criminal punishment.
I. THE FOUNDATION: CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO THE
DEATH PENALTY
In modern times, the Catholic Church's opposition to the
death penalty begins with the belief that all human life is sacred.5
As Pope John Paul II explained:
The new evangelization calls for followers of Christ who are
unconditionally pro-life: who will proclaim, celebrate and
serve the Gospel of life in every situation. A sign of hope is
the increasing recognition that the dignity of human life
must never be taken away, even in the case of someone who
has done great evil.6
The Church's position does not require an absolute
prohibition against imposing the death penalty; rather, the
Church recognizes an exception if the death penalty is the only
means to protect the lives of innocent others. According to the
Catechism: "Assuming that the guilty party's identity and
responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional
teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death
3. See HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1993).
4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (noting that "the penalty of death is different in kind from
any other punishment" and emphasizing its "uniqueness"); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The penalty of death differs from all
other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.").
5. This Article accepts that this modern view, expressed particularly in the
teachings of Pope John Paul II, is consistent with the Tradition of the Church. This
question, though, has provoked disagreement among scholars. See generally JAMES
J. MEGIVERN, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL SURVEY
(1997).
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penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively defending
human lives against the unjust aggressor. 7
However, the exception is more theoretical than practical
because "the cases in which the execution of the offender is an
absolute necessity 'are very rare, if not practically non-existent."'"
Given the ability of our penal system to confine dangerous
offenders, rarely if ever will execution be the only way that the
state can prevent someone from killing others.
The reason for prohibiting the death penalty, except in cases
of strict necessity, is concern for both "the common good" and "the
dignity of the human person." The Catechism explains: "If,
however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect
people's safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to
such means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete
conditions of the common good and are more in conformity with
the dignity of the human person."9
Opposition to the death penalty thus begins with the
fundamental truth that human life is sacred; it is created by God
and is created in God's image, and therefore, the existence of a
human life-its beginning and its ending-is the sole dominion of
God. 1° The sacredness of every human life requires that all
people be treated with respect for their inherent human dignity.
Ending a human life, however, is not always inconsistent with
respect for human dignity; the law of double effect, for example,
allows the administration of life-threatening and even life-ending
medications if the purpose of the medications is to alleviate
pain.' While not all life-ending actions are violations of the
7. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2267 (2d ed. 1997).
8. Id. (quoting EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 1, 56).
9. Id.; accord EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 1, 56.
10. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, RESPONSIBILITY,
REHABILITATION, AND RESTORATION: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21 (2000) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY, REHABILITATION, AND
RESTORATION], available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/criminal-justice-restorative-justice/crime-and-criminal-justice.cfm ("The
fundamental starting point for all of Catholic social teaching is the defense of human
life and dignity: every human person is created in the image and likeness of God and
has an inviolable dignity, value, and worth, regardless of race, gender, class or other
human characteristics."). "Human life is sacred because from its beginning it
involves the creative action of God and it remains for ever in a special relationship
with the Creator, who is its sole end." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra
note 7, 2258 (emphasis omitted).
11. See T.A. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND
Loyola Law Review [Vol. 60
sanctity of life, the death penalty does not conform to the dignity
of the human person because it ends a human life for the purpose
of criminal punishment.
Much has been written about whether criminal punishment,
in general, is best justified in terms of deterrence or retribution.12
Those on the side of deterrence argue that the imposition of pain
(by any actor, including the state) is a harm or "disutility" that is
justified when it avoids the experience of an even greater amount
of pain; thus, punishment is justified when it prevents future
crimes and thereby maximizes utility.13  Deterrence theory
asserts that "punishment is justified if it generates more utility,
happiness, pleasure, benefit, or good consequences than disutility,
suffering, pain, expense, or bad consequences. 14
Those on the side of retribution argue that punishment is
justified when it is deserved. People who commit crimes accrue a
benefit to themselves at the expense of those they harm.
Criminal punishment is the way that someone "pays" for his
crime; it "is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate
the value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through
AVOIDING EVIL 1-14 (2006).
12. For a basic overview, see SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 101 (7th ed. 2001)
("Broadly speaking, the justifications for punishment fall into two large groups,
retributive and utilitarian."). Framing the question as a choice between retribution
and deterrence (or any other particular justifications for punishment) is, to some
extent, misleading because few scholars claim that there is one single purpose for
imposing criminal punishment. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of
Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938,
1941-42 (1988) (discussing theories of criminal punishment). Broadly speaking,
retribution and deterrence are both appropriate goals of the criminal punishment
system, as are many other goals, including rehabilitation, moral education, and
public catharsis. See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387,
441 (2002) (observing that "retribution, deterrence, public catharsis, education in
social norms, incapacitation, [and] rehabilitation" are determinants of just sentences
for individual offenders as well as the social ends served by criminal punishments
generally). On the other hand, there are some punishments, such as the death
penalty, that do require some theorists to choose a side. If the death penalty does
deter, does that mean that it is therefore justified, even if it is a harsher punishment
that the offender deserves? Or, if the offender deserves the punishment of death,
does that mean that the punishment is therefore justified, even if it does not deter
others? An additional issue is that retribution and deterrence are not only
justifications for punishment-the reasons why punishment is warranted at all-
they are also purposes of punishment-what punishment hopes to achieve. See id.
13. Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and
Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 114 (2003).
14. Id.
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the construction of an event that not only repudiates the action's
message of superiority over the victim, but does so in a way that
confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity."15  The
Catholic Church has largely sided with the retributivists; for
example, Pope John Paul II stated in his encyclical letter
Evangelium Vitae that "[t]he primary purpose of the punishment
which society inflicts is 'to redress the disorder caused by the
offence."" 6
Regarding the particular question whether death as a
punishment is justified, some who support the death penalty do
so because they believe that the death penalty deters-that when
one murderer is sentenced to death and executed, other would-be
murderers are deterred from killing, and thus, the net effect is
that lives are saved.'7 The basis for this belief likely cannot be
definitively proven or disproven.18 Even though there are many
good reasons to believe that the death penalty does not deter,19 it
is possible that it does deter.20
15. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992).
16. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 1, 56 (quoting CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 7, 2267); see also Pope Pius XII, Crime and
Punishment, 6 CATH. LAW. 92, 94 (1960) ("The order violated by the criminal act
demands the restoration and re-establishment of the equilibrium which has been
disturbed. It is the proper task of law and justice to guard and preserve the harmony
between duty, on the one hand, and the law, on the other, and to re-establish this
harmony if it has been injured.").
17. See Chad Flanders, The Case Against the Case Against the Death Penalty, 16
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 595, 600 (2013).
18. See id. ("The first issue we must address when it comes to deterrence is the
deceptively simple question of whether there is, in fact, any good evidence that the
death penalty deters. The debate over this is controversial, fierce, and-it must be
said-ultimately inconclusive. It is, all sides concede, very difficult to measure
whether the death penalty deters.").
19. The question is really whether the punishment of death deters more than
other punishments, such as life imprisonment. The difficulty is that in order for the
death penalty to be a greater deterrent than another punishment, many unlikely
conditions would have to exist: "[A] potential offender who is at least indirectly aware
of the rule intended to influence his conduct; a perception that the immediate benefit
of the crime is less than the delayed and doubtful possibility of a distant punishment;
a sufficiently rational actor who is sufficiently free of decision-distorting influences to
be able and willing to respond to the manipulation of rules by altering his conduct;
and a resulting deterrent effect not so incrementally dissipated as to be trivial." Paul
H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 1001 (2003).
20. Compare Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital
Punishment's Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 233 (2005)
(finding that "each execution deters, on average, 4.5 murders"), with Michael L.
Loyola Law Review [Vol. 60
Others who support the death penalty say that death is the
proper payment for the crime of murder-that the deserved
punishment for taking the life of an innocent person is the loss of
the offender's life.21 This argument has a certain formalistic
appeal. In the Old Testament of The Bible, the rule is presented
as "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth."22 Some death
penalty proponents cite this Biblical endorsement of "lex talionis"
justice as establishing a moral foundation for the argument that
those who commit murder should themselves be killed.23
Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the
Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (1996) (reporting that approximately
80% of criminologists believe existing research does not support the deterrence
justification).
21. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1669 (1986) ("Execution [is] ... the only fitting retribution for
murder I can think of."); see also Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian
Retributivist Theory of Punishment: A Response to Professor Pugsley, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 273, 301 (1982) ("The death penalty has always been considered a standard
example of retributive justice; there is no other punishment that can be inflicted on a
murderer that could possibly be proportionate to his crime." (footnote omitted)). The
Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that under the Eighth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for crimes
that do not cause the death of another person. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Moreover, those who are
sentenced to death must be "the worst of the worst:" the death penalty is an
excessive punishment for "ordinary" murder. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 (1976); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) ("Since Gregg, our
jurisprudence has consistently confined the imposition of the death penalty to a
narrow category of the most serious crimes."); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206
(2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "within the category of capital crimes, the
death penalty must be reserved for 'the worst of the worst"'),
22. The "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" formula appears three times in the Old
Testament: Exodus 21:23-25, Deuteronomy 19:19-21, and Leviticus 24:17-21. At the
time, "an eye for an eye" was a step towards more just punishments. See Morris J.
Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment, 28
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 57 (2008) (stating that "the lex talionis of the Old
Testament marked a turning point in the evolution of lawful punishment" because
"[iut introduced a policy of restraint and it sanctified proportionality as a moral
principle of punishment"); Monica Kostielney, Understanding Justice with Clarity,
Civility, and Compassion: Reflections on Selected Biblical Passages and Catholic
Church Teachings on the Death Penalty, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 967, 969-70 (1996).
It is also possible that the passage in Exodus was meant to apply to civil penalties
rather than criminal punishment. See Clifford S. Fishman, "Old Testament Justice,"
51 CATH. U. L. REV. 405, 414 (2002). Other passages, however, imply support for "an
eye for an eye" for those who commit crimes. See Richard H. Hiers, The Death
Penalty and Due Process in Biblical Law, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 751, 797-98
(2004). For example, Genesis states: '"hoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall
his blood be shed." Genesis 9:5-6.
23. See Jacob Sullum, The Death Penalty is Just, in THE DEATH PENALTY:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 57 (Carol Wekesser ed., 2d ed. 1991).
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The Catholic Church-along with most every other
religion-rejects this formalistic approach to determining what
punishment ought to be imposed when someone commits a
24crime. Determining the appropriate punishment for the crime
of murder is the topic of much discussion, in large part because of
the issue of the death penalty, but determining the appropriate
punishment for any crime is a far from simple matter. The
magnitude of social harm that a crime causes certainly is
relevant to determining what and how much punishment is
appropriate. Generally, those who kill should be punished more
harshly than those who assault. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that those who kill ought to themselves be killed, just
as, for example, those who assault ought not necessarily be
assaulted themselves. A theory of retribution can say that both
the murderer and the assaulter deserve to be punished and also
that-all other things being equal25-the murderer deserves to be
punished more harshly than the assaulter, but a theory of
retribution cannot say more precisely what or how much
punishment either offender should receive.
Answering the questions what and how much punishment
an offender should receive requires a theory that goes beyond the
premise that someone who violates the criminal law deserves to
be punished. Such a theory must offer an understanding of the
human condition that can help explain why a particular kind or a
particular amount of punishment is or is not warranted.
Retributivist theories often incorporate the principle of
proportionality to explain how to determine what and how much
24. See Michael L. Radelet, The Role of Organized Religions in Changing Death
Penalty Debates, 9 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 201, 207 (2000) ("Leaders of
Catholic, most Protestant (with the notable exception of the most fundamentalist
denominations), and Jewish denominations are strongly opposed to the death
penalty, and most formal religious organizations in the U.S. have endorsed
statements in favor of abolition."). Of course, this principle is explicitly rejected in
the New Testament: "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth
for a tooth.' But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on
the right cheek, turn to him the other also." Matthew 5:38-39.
25. It is possible that in a given case, factors other than the nature of the crime
will influence whether and to what extent someone deserves to be punished. For
example, a juvenile who commits murder is likely to be less culpable than an adult,
and someone who is legally insane is not culpable at all. See Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of
juveniles, in part because juveniles are unlikely to be as culpable for their crimes as
adults); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 596 (1997) (discussing why people who are legally insane are not culpable for
their crimes).
Loyola Law Review
punishment a particular offender deserves. This principle-
which asserts that "the severity of a punishment should be a
function of the seriousness of the offense" 26-can be helpful in
explaining what is wrong with severe punishments for minor
offenses (or with minor punishments for severe offenses), but it is
not especially helpful in creating a finely-tuned system of
sentencing. As two noted sentencing law scholars have stated: "A
law of proportionality does not imply that there is a right
sentence in each case but it does imply that there can be wrong
sentences and inappropriate ranges."27
The principle of proportionality can help us achieve criminal
sentences that are relatively just, but achieving criminal
sentences that are just in an absolute sense depends upon how we
view people who commit crimes.28  The Catholic Church
understands human beings as created by God, in God's own
image, and existing always in relation to God. Those who commit
crimes should be punished, but their punishment should never
deny their intrinsic humanity.
This is a principle that U.S. law purports to endorse. The
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, for example,
are replete with references to human dignity. In one recent death
penalty case, for example, the Court stated: "The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man... ,"29 In another death penalty case, the Court
26. Douglas N. Husak, 'Already Punished Enough?," 18 PHIL. TOPICs 79, 83
(1990) ("A corollary of the 'just deserts' theory is the principle of proportionality,
according to which the severity of a punishment should be a function of the
seriousness of the offense.").
27. Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, The Emerging Proportionality Law for
Measuring Departures, 2 FED. SENT'G REP. 255, 256 (1990).
28. In other words, the proportionality principle is concerned with informing
ordinal rankings, not with establishing punishment continuum endpoints:
Every society must decide what punishment it will allow for its most egregious
case, be it the death penalty, life imprisonment, or fifteen years. Once that
endpoint is set, the challenge for the adjudication system is to determine who
should be punished and how much punishment each should be given. That
process of distributing punishment requires only an ordinal ranking of offenders
according to their blameworthiness.... Ordinal ranking does not require a
specific amount of punishment in an absolute sense. It requires imposition of
only that specific amount of punishment that will put the offender at the
appropriate ordinal rank given the punishment continuum endpoint in that
society.
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
29. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
[Vol. 60
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similarly stated: "Evolving standards of decency must embrace
and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the
punishment of criminals must conform to that rule."3 And in a
very recent case involving prison conditions, the Court stated that
"[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all
persons."
31
Despite the nominal acceptance of the principle that all
humans, even those who have committed the most horrendous
crimes, possess an inherent human dignity, the practice of
criminal punishment in the U.S. has in many ways failed to
translate the principle into practices that respect the humanity of
criminal offenders.3 ' This Article seeks to draw upon the
teachings of the Catholic Church to provide moral support for
efforts to make the practice of criminal punishment more fully
respect the human dignity of all persons. A recent law review
article posed the question: "How does one convince the public to
care about prison reform when the vast majority do not know
anyone in prison and are probably reassured that most people
who do spend time in prison are not like them?"33 This Article
suggests that one possible answer to that question is: By
connecting the need to address the inhumanity of our present
prison system with a moral code that is founded upon a belief in
the inherent human dignity of every person.
II. BEYOND THE DEATH PENALTY
According to the calculations of the Bureau of Justice,
2,239,800 people were imprisoned in the United States in 2011.
3
1
Although it is hard to think that there might be good news in a
30. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008).
31. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
32. For example, despite its observation that the Eighth Amendment serves to
protect human dignity, the Supreme Court of the United States made it difficult for
those who claim that punishment practices are "cruel and unusual" when it adopted
a policy of deferring to prison administrators' assessments: "Prison
administrators.., should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
33. David Cole, Thrning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 27, 43 (2011).
34. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 3 (2012), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusl1.pdf.
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prison population of more than 2 million people, the total for 2011
was lower than the count for 2010, and it was the third
consecutive decrease from the peak count of 2,307,500 in 2008.11
Despite the small decreases in the prison population over the
past three years, the United States remains one of the most
punitive countries in the world. 6 What accounts for our slightly
improved yet still excessive levels of imprisonment? The U.S.
prison population began to increase exponentially in the 1970s,37
owing to the enactment of a flurry of "get tough on crime"
sentencing legislation.38 Our "war on crime," however, has come
to look a lot like a "war on people who commit crimes," fueled by a
retributivism that embraces vengeance rather than desert. 39
The effects of this acceptance of vengeance as a justification
for criminal punishment are visible not just in the numbers-how
many people are punished and for how long-but also in the
particular system of punishment we have created-a system that
relies almost exclusively on long periods of imprisonment and
tolerates a degree of brutality that cannot be defended as justified
by any theory of punishment. It is here that Catholic social
teaching can offer support to those working to create a more
humane system.
A. FROM DESERT TO VENGEANCE
Our reliance on imprisonment, and very long periods of
imprisonment, as the default means of imposing punishment in
this country is at least a reflection of, and perhaps also a result
of, viewing offenders as less than human. Saint Augustine
taught: "[H]ate the sin but not the sinner."4 In the U.S. penal
system, the distinction between crime and criminal is lost; we
punish the criminal. Moreover, we degrade the criminal until we
35. GLAZE & PARKS, supra note 34, at 3.
36. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
37. In 1970, the prison population was less that 200,000; by 2005, it was more
than 2 million. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 104 (2d ed. 1988) (reporting that the number
of jail inmates reached 160,863 in 1970); GLAZE & PARKS, supra note 34, at 3
(reporting that the inmate population for 2005 was 2,195,500).
38. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Section II(A).
40. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
14, 24 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (quoting Saint Augustine).
[Vol. 60
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no longer think of him41 as a member of the human family;42 then,
we treat him accordingly.43
The degrading, dehumanizing rhetoric is most obvious and
most extreme when the crime is murder. Those who are
convicted of murder are called "monsters," not only by victims'
families, members of the public, and the media, but also by
prosecutors,44 sentencing judges, 45 and legislators. 46  Offenders
who have committed murder are most likely to be cast as sub-
human, but other offenders are also subjected to this kind of
dehumanization by language. For example, one study observed
that during one series of Congressional debates:
[T]he majority in Congress defined anyone involved in the
drug trade, from "kingpins" to low-level couriers, in abstract,
non-human terms. They labelled these individuals as a
41. To avoid the cumbersome "him or her," and also in recognition that the vast
majority of those imprisoned are men, this Article uses masculine pronouns to refer
collectively to both men and women.
42. One scholar has observed that because minorities are overrepresented among
prison inmates, it is already easy for the majority to think of them as "the other."
Cole, supra note 33, at 28 ("[O]ne reason that the majority can tolerate such high
rates of incarceration is that most of those incarcerated are seen as 'the other'-
African Americans, Latinos, and/or the poor.").
43. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 692 (1989) ("The more we can designate a
person as fundamentally different from ourselves, the fewer moral doubts we have
about condemning and hurting that person. We assign the offender the mythic role
of Monster, a move which justifies harsh treatment and insulates us from moral
concerns about the suffering we inflict.").
44. See, e.g., Comer v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2006) (reporting
prosecutor's use of "monster," "filth," and "reincarnation of the devil"); Malicoat v.
Mullin, 426 F.3d 1241, 1256 (10th Cir. 2005) ("evil" and "a monster"); Oken v.
Corcoran, 220 F.3d 259, 270 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000) ("monster"); Kellogg v. Skon, 176
F.3d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1999) ("monster," "sexual deviant," and "liar").
45. See, e.g., Vetter v. Ayers, No. CV 06-1728-R(RC), 2009 WL 3672829, at *13
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009); People v. Foulk, B231469, 2012 WL 2336247, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 20, 2012); People v. Ball, No. 295851, 2011 WL 1086557, at *3 (Mich. Ct.
App. Mar. 24, 2011); Neloms v. State, 274 P.3d 161, 170 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012).
46. In California, state Representative Chuck Quackenbush, arguing in support
of a bill that lowered the age at which juveniles could be tried as adults for murder,
referred to the "P[]ittle monsters we have today who murder in cold blood' who must
be 'punished and walled off from society for a very long period of time, if not forever."'
Barry Krisberg, The Politics of the War Against the Young, in AFTER THE WAR ON
CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION 195 (Mary Louise
Frampton et al. eds., 2008), quoted in Sara Sun Beale, You've Come a Long Way,
Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 535 (2009).
Loyola Law Review
'scourge' and as a warring enemy attacking from the outside.
They characterized even low-level couriers as "merchants of
death," incapable of understanding all but the most violent
threats (and perhaps not even those).47
As an expression of the pain caused by an offender's actions,
"monster" is understandable. And in part, our criminal justice
system exists to impose pain on an offender to redress the
wrongfulness of his crime.48 Criminal punishment reestablishes
the societal order that the offender's crime disrupted. Criminal
punishment thus serves as a sort of penance. As one prominent
philosopher has explained: "[Punishment] is a burden imposed on
an offender for his crime, through which, it is hoped, he will come
to repent his crime, to begin to reform himself, and thus reconcile
himself with those he has wronged. ''49 Or as Pope Pius XII wrote:
[Ilt would be incorrect to reject completely, and as a matter of
principle, the function of vindictive punishment. While man
is on earth, such punishment both can and should help
toward his eternal salvation .... The result of vindictive
penalties is in no way opposed to the function of punishment,
which is the re-establishment and restoration of the order of
justice which has been disrupted .... 0
Punishment becomes mere vengeance, however, when it is
47. Michele H. Kalstein, Kirstie A. McCornock & Seth A. Rosenthal, Calculating
Injustice: The Fixation on Punishment as Crime Control, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
575, 610-11 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
48. Some proponents of a "restorative justice" approach to criminal justice have
argued that the imposition of pain is not a necessary part of a valid system. See, e.g.,
Stephen E. Henderson, Hijacked from Both Sides-Why Religious Extremists and
Religious Bigots Share an Interest in Preventing Academic Discourse on Criminal
Jurisprudence Based on the First Principles of Christianity, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 103,
129-30 (2000). However, other scholars have argued-more convincingly, I believe-
that justice cannot be restored unless the offender suffers some form of deprivation.
See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801,
1819-27 (1999). Additionally, there is the moral instinct that justice requires that
offenders suffer. See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 276 (2011) (noting the popular belief that
"something is amiss when a serious wrongdoer is not punished"). Or as philosopher
Jean Hampton explains: 'When a serious wrongdoer gets a mere slap on the wrist
after performing an act that diminished her victim, the punisher ratifies the view
that the victim is indeed the sort of being who is low relative to the wrongdoer."
Hampton, supra note 15, at 1691.
49. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 106 (2001).
50. Pope Pius XII, International Penal Law, in 1 MAJOR ADDRESSES OF POPE PIUS
XII 244, 313 (Vincent A. Yzermans ed., St. Paul The N. Cent. Publ'g Co. 1961) (1939).
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about nothing more than imposing pain.51 Indeed, one reason for
having a public system of criminal punishment is to guard
against the likelihood that those seeking vengeance will
precipitate a "downward spiral of violence," motivated by their
own personal pain, unrestrained by reason or by considerations of
the overall public good.52 Viewing offenders as "monsters" so that
we can execute them or sentence them to "rot" in prison is
consistent with a desire to inflict pain, but it is inconsistent with
a more reasoned, tempered approach to criminal justice.
B. RELIANCE ON IMPRISONMENT
The attitude of much of the public in the United States
towards imprisonment seems to be: If some is good, more must be
better.53 Although this trend seems to be abating slightly in
51. Or in the language of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
a punishment is "cruel and unusual" when it is an "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion), that
"serves no valid legislative purpose." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 331 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
52. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 10 (1998). Minow explains:
Vengeance is the impulse to retaliate when wrongs are done. Through
vengeance, we express our basic self-respect.... Vengeance is also the
wellspring of a notion of equivalence that animates justice.... Yet vengeance
could unleash more response than the punishment guided by the rule of
law .... The danger is that precisely the same vengeful motive often leads
people to exact more than necessary .... The core motive may be admirable but
it carries with it potential insatiability. Vengeance thus can set in motion a
downward spiral of violence ....
Id. Another scholar put the matter somewhat more directly: 'We do indeed harbor a
strong natural tendency to perceive offenders as 'dangerous and vile,' and therefore
to strike them hard: Human beings are so constituted that they typically want, not to
punish in a measured way, but to crush offenders like cockroaches." James Q.
Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 98 (2003). An
additional reason why the state and not the individual is the preferred imposer of
punishment is that the state bears the collective moral authority of all of its citizens:
[S]ome crimes are so serious that we cannot imagine any person or institution
sufficing as an adequate agent other than the state.... [T]he modern state is the
citizenry's moral representative; in the face of pluralism and religious
controversy, it is the only institutional voice of the community's shared moral
values. Serious crimes represent serious attacks on those moral views, and in
particular, on the conception of worth animating those views, and thus the state
is the only institution that can speak and act on behalf of the community against
the diminishment accomplished by the crime.
Hampton, supra note 15, at 1694.
53. This attitude has been labeled "popular punitiveness." See Donald Braman,
Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions
in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1183 (2006) ("Standard accounts of the rise of
incarceration and the resurgent interest in archaic forms of punishment often refer
to the emergence of a 'popular punitiveness' in America. According to this theory,
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recent years,54  the period since the mid-1970s has been
characterized by the adoption of "tough on crime" practices that
have caused prison populations to rise dramatically. In 1970, the
prison population (including those held in federal prisons, state
prisons, and local jails) was approximately 330,000; by 2005, it
was more than 2 million. 55 To put these numbers in context, the
U.S. now has the highest rate of incarceration in the world, more
than seven times higher, for example, than the rates in developed
democratic states of western Europe.56
Two of the practices that are most responsible for this
exponential increase in the number of people imprisoned are
mandatory minimum sentences, which now apply to a broad
range of offenses and require long prison sentences, 57 and the
adoption of legislatively enacted "real offense" sentencing
the public demands harsher and harsher penalties as an expression of its fear of
crime and its disgust with criminality." (footnotes omitted)); see also Rachel E.
Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1276, 1276
(2005) ("The politics of sentencing over the past three decades have consistently
produced longer prison terms and an escalation in tough-on-crime rhetoric,
regardless of whether crime rates have been going up or down.").
54. See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372
(eliminating the mandatory minimum sentence for possession of crack); see also Scott
Wilson, Obama Signs Fair Sentencing Act, WASH. POST, (Aug. 3, 2010, 3:43 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/08/obama-signs-fair-sentencing-ac.html
(discussing how the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the crack-cocaine
sentencing disparity from 100:1 to 18:1).
55. See Vincent Schiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg, The Punishing Decade: Prison and
Jail Estimates at the Millennium, JUST. POL'Y INST., May 1, 2000, at 1, available at
www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/j usticepolicy/documents/punishing_decade.pdf
(reporting that the number of prison and jail inmates was 338,029 in 1970); GLAZE &
PARKS, supra note 34, at 3 (reporting that the inmate population for 2005 was
2,195,500).
56. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1-3 tbls.2 & 4 (8th ed.
2009), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/
resources/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Facts About
Prisons and Prisoners, SENT'G PROJECT (July 2008), available at http://www.ala.org/
ala/aboutala/offices/olos/prisonjfacts.pdf; see also ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
publications/incNoExitSept2009.pdf.
57. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (2011),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/LegislativeandPublic-Affairs/Congressional_
Testimony-andReports/MandatoryMinimum_Penalties/20111031_RtCMandatory
_Minimum.cfm ("Congressional action in the 1980s resulted in the enactment of
many additional mandatory minimum penalties and an increase in the length of
existing penalties-particularly for drug offenses and violent crimes.").
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guidelines, which also require long sentences58 and have left
judges with diminished discretion to make case-by-case
reductions in sentences.
59
During the 1980s, Congress enacted laws that mandated
such sentences as a minimum of five years of imprisonment for
possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine 61 or for using
or carrying a firearm during a "crime of violence.' States also
adopted mandatory sentences, including New York's "Rockefeller
Drug Laws," which mandated a sentence of fifteen years to life for
selling two ounces or possessing four ounces of heroin or
cocaine; 62 California's "Three Strikes" law, which mandated a
minimum twenty-five year sentence for offenders who committed
a third "violent" or "serious" felony;63 and Florida's "10-20-Life"
law, which mandated a minimum ten-year prison sentence for
any offender who "carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or
attempts to use any weapon or firearm" during the commission of
58. David Yellen, Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Misguided
Approach To Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267, 268-69 (2005). Although
the Guideline sentences were supposed to reflect the pre-Guidelines sentences, many
offenders have ended up with longer sentences because the Guidelines provide for
"real offense" sentencing, allowing judges to increase sentences based on factors
other than the convicted offense. See id. As one scholar explains:
For example, suppose a defendant is convicted of a drug-possession charge and
acquitted of a charge that he was part of a larger drug conspiracy. Under the
federal system, if a judge finds that the defendant was part of the conspiracy,
the Sentencing Guidelines provide that the defendant's sentence should be set
on the basis of the drugs involved in that conspiracy, regardless of the jury's
acquittal.
Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 119, 133
(2005).
59. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Kate
Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
60. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181,
4370; see also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(providing for a five year mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking offenses
involving 5 grams of crack cocaine).
61. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98
Stat. 2138, 2138-39 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
62. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-.65 (McKinney 1999). These laws were
recently revised. See Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal '70s Drug
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 5644088; Brian Mann,
How the Rockefeller drug laws changed America, N. COUNTRY PUB. RADIO (Jan. 24,
2013), http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/21316/201301241how-the-
rockefeller-drug-laws-changed-america.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (Deering 2013); id. § 1170.12(c)(2).
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a felony.6 4 Mandatory life without parole, even for first time
offenders, is the sentence imposed for the sale of 650 grams of
heroin or cocaine under Michigan's "Public Act 368 of 1978.
"165
In addition to mandatory sentences for certain crimes, the
federal government and many state governments require judges
to determine an offender's sentence according to a set of
structured guidelines.66 The federal Sentencing Guidelines were
enacted in 1987 for the specific purpose of limiting judges'
discretion at sentencing.67 This limited discretion, combined with
"real offense" sentencing and longer sentences for many offenses,
resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of people sentenced
to federal prisons.
68
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Booker made the federal Sentencing Guidelines "effectively
advisory" rather than mandatory-a ruling that has increased
judges' sentencing discretion.69 It remains to be seen, however,
whether this ruling will result in a reduction in imprisonment.0
After Booker, judges are not bound to impose a sentence within
the range recommended under the Sentencing Guidelines, but
64. FLA. STAT. § 775.087(1) (2012).
65. See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that the
mandatory sentence of life in prison under Michigan's law was not cruel and unusual
punishment).
66. For a discussion of state guidelines systems, see Richard S. Frase, State
Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (2005). In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission
enacted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2011
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 406-08 (2011), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/201 1_Guidelines/ManualPDF/index.cfm.
67. See Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ's Attack on Federal
Judicial "Leniency," the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Criminal
Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 521-23 (2009).
68. See id. at 523 ("Predictably, the combination of the Guidelines, mandatory
minimum and consecutive penalties, the drug war, demographics, three strikes laws,
and the federalization of crime brought about a population explosion in the federal
prison system-an increase of over 600 percent since the 1980s-as more people were
sent to prison for longer periods of time.").
69. See 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). A year earlier, the Court had similarly ruled
that Washington's sentencing guidelines were invalid, to the extent that they allowed
judges to impose sentences above the beyond "standard range" based on facts that
were not found by the jury. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
70. See Paul J. Hofer, Has Booker Restored Balance? A Look at Data on Plea
Bargaining and Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 326, 328 (2011) (presenting data
demonstrating that "sentences imposed continue to be driven by the now-advisory
guidelines").
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they still must calculate this sentence, which serves as the
"starting point and initial benchmark. 71 Additionally, a sentence
that is within the Sentencing Guidelines range must be given
"respectful consideration, 72 and departures from this range must
be "sufficient[ly] justifi[ed]."73  On review, appellate courts may
presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable.74
C. ACCEPTANCE OF BRUTALITY
"Total institutions" such as prisons are to some extent
inherently dehumanizing.75 But the dehumanizing properties of
U.S. prisons go far beyond this inherent quality. Commentators,
including judges, have used words like "brutal" and "barbarous"
to describe the conditions within many U.S. prisons.76 These
inhumane conditions consist of physical violence, from beatings
by prison guards to gang rapes by other inmates,77 as well as
71. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
72. Kimbrough v. Unites States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).
73. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46 ("[A] district judge must give serious consideration to the
extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an
unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case
with sufficient justifications.").
74. Id. at 51.
75. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 239-40 (1979)
("Studies on the effects of long-term incarceration in 'total institutions' indicate that
long-term confinement develops in persons an 'institutional personality'-i.e. a
personality with diminished affect, neurotic dependencies, loss of autonomy and
mental competence generally: in short, a kind of death (of personhood).").
76. See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 95 (2010)
(discussing the harshness of prison conditions as described by Professor James Q.
Whitman). Even Justice Kennedy, in a case challenging procedures for placing
inmates in high security prisons, observed: "Prison security, imperiled by the brutal
reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop of the State's interest. Clandestine,
organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a
means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less
than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls." Wilkinson
v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005).
77. See Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, § 2(2), 117 Stat.
972 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2006)) (finding that more than a
million people had been raped in prison during the prior twenty-year period); ALLEN
J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL
PRISONS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2007, at 2 (rev. 2008), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No
ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 70 (2001). In a classic study of the
psychological dynamics between prison guards and inmates, psychologist Phillip
Zimbardo found that university students, randomly assigned to role-play either
guards or inmates in a simulated prison, quickly adopted attitudes and behaviors
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psychological violence, caused by the generalized stress of the
prison environment 78  or the torture of extended solitary
confinement.7 9
Scholars have debated whether prison conditions are
rightfully considered part of an offender's punishment. 80 On one
hand, our present system generally assigns people to particular
prison conditions based not on the severity of their offenses, but
on their propensity to act violently while confined. 1 Thus, those
consistent with their roles. PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT:
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007). The guards became abusive,
the inmates became submissive, and the experiment had to be terminated after only
a few days because of safety concerns. See id.
78. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 123 (2007)
("Vhatever happens, fear will be a prisoner's constant companion from the beginning
to end of his prison sentence,").
79. Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness
in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW
104, 104 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/
Solitary%20Confmement%20and%2OMental%20Illness%20in%20US%2OPrisons.pdf
("Isolation can be psychologically harmful to any prisoner, with the nature and
severity of the impact depending on the individual, the duration, and particular
conditions (e.g., access to natural light, books, or radio). Psychological effects can
include anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive disturbances, perceptual distortions,
obsessive thoughts, paranoia, and psychosis.").
80. See, e.g., Thomas K. Landry, "Punishment" and the Eighth Amendment, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 1607, 1621-23 (1996). This discussion assumes that although
conditions vary widely among different prisons, none of the conditions is so harsh as
to be inhumane.
81. Inmate placement is a prison management matter, not a sentencing matter.
Judges may make recommendations, but there is no guarantee that they will be
followed. For example, in the federal system among the factors that are considered
when determining an offender's placement are "the resources of the facility
contemplated;" "the nature and circumstances of the offense;" "the history and
characteristics of the prisoner;" and "any statement by the court that imposed the
sentence--concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was
determined to be warranted; or recommending a type of penal or correctional facility
as appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006). In practice, the Bureau of Prisons relies
primarily on information in the offender's presentence report to make a placement
decision. Nancy Glass, The Social Workers of Sentencing? Probation Officers,
Discretion, and the Accuracy of Presentence Reports Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 21, 54 (2010). As explained in a recent report:
Inmates in federal prison can be housed in facilities ranging from minimum
security level institutions (known as federal prison camps) that have ample
opportunities for work and programs to far more restrictive facilities for the
most dangerous, violent, or escape-prone prisoners. A prisoner's placement by
the BOP depends on his classification on a scale from zero to twenty-four.
Classification is determined by a variety of factors, including the severity of the
offense, length of confinement, criminal history, and prior attempts to escape.
Public safety factors are also used to determine placement. PSFs are assigned
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who have committed murder or rape might well be housed with
those who have committed low-level, non-violent drug offenses,
for example. s2 On this account, it is the severity of the sentence-
twenty-five years of imprisonment for the rapist and five years
for the drug possessor, for example-that is the measure of
punishment severity, not the conditions of the imprisonment.8 3
Others argue that those who commit less serious offenses should
experience their punishment as less severe-not just in quantity
of years in prison, but also in quality of life experience during
those years. 4
for certain activities in the prisoner's record, such as designation as a sex
offender, or belonging to a "disruptive group," i.e., a gang. PSFs have a great
effect on placement-a single PSF rules out prison camp as a confinement
option, and the "disruptive group" PSF means automatic placement in a high
security facility.
Glass, supra note 81, at 55 (footnotes omitted).
82. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 885 n.13 (2009) ("The aim is to place prisoners in the least
restrictive classification in which they can be housed safely and coexist peaceably
with other inmates. If the profile of a convicted murderer indicates a nonviolent and
cooperative disposition, he may well end up in minimum security, whereas a check
kiter with a long institutional history of violence will wind up in maximum security."
(citing DEAN CHAMPION, MEASURING OFFENDER RISK: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SOURCEBOOK 53-54 (1994)).
83. Professor Robert Blecker described this attitude as existing among both the
corrections offers and the inmates at Lorton Central, a federal prison in Virginia:
[B]y their actions and attitudes consistent with official D.C. Department of
Corrections policy, officers and inmates reject retribution as a goal of
punishment on the inside for past conduct on the outside. To them, the judge
metes out punishment by setting the number of years during which all inmates
will be equally deprived of liberty. The officers see no point in trying to make
prison more painful for prisoners because they "deserve" it, unless they deserve
it for their conduct inside prison.... As Captain Townshend said: "It's none of
my business. What a man is like in here is what I'm concerned with, not what
he did out there."
Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1171-72 (1990) (footnote omitted)). For
a criticism of this view, see Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of
Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009) (objecting that "our sentencing
provisions pay fetishistic attention to the duration of terms of incarceration while
largely ignoring the many other ways that prison sentences vary" and putting forth
an extended argument that prison systems should be calibrated to particular inmate
characteristics).
84. Professor Robert Blecker, for example, has observed that "by severing the
crime committed outside from the quality of time spent inside, the guards, the
prisoners, and the prison's administration further undermine retribution: The short-
term, first-time offenders suffer most, while the most hardened criminals-with the
best contacts, the best hustles, and the best jobs--enjoy the softest lifestyle."
Blecker, supra note 83, at 1216. Blecker further observes that "criminals who
committed relatively minor crimes, who long to return to their families, live in a
'death trap,' while those who have murdered, raped, and robbed, in the midst of their
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While there is much to be said in favor of the argument that
those whose crimes are less serious should experience prison
conditions that are less harsh, it is important that this argument
does not become a way to justify prison conditions that are
physically violent or psychologically traumatizing. Imprisonment
punishes first and foremost because it is a deprivation of liberty;
8 5
it does not, justifiably, punish16 because prisons are "a dangerous
place to live."
87
Prison conditions can be especially brutal for people who are
mentally ill.88  In 2003, Human Rights Watch reported that
long sentences, continue to prey on the weak." Blecker, supra note 83, at 1228.
Blecker proposes that prison administration should be reformed and that
convicts should be separated into groups according to the seriousness of the
crime committed. For the entire duration of their sentences, they should live
among others who committed crimes of equal seriousness. These classes of
criminals are the layers, and the quality of life of each layer inside should
always remain a function of the crime committed outside. Within each layer,
however, inmates may progress in stages.
Id at 1245 (footnote omitted).
85. This is not to say that "unintentional" consequences of imprisonment should
not count as punishment. In fact, it makes sense to consider the "unintentional"
consequences of imprisonment when assigning offenders to particular prisons-those
who have committed the most serious offenses should be assigned to the prisons with
the harshest conditions (so long as those conditions are not inhumane, either in the
sense of being cruel or unusual or in the sense of not respecting prisoners' inherent
human dignity). From the inmates' point of view at least, it is certainly true that
"[i]n the most concrete sense, whatever conditions a prisoner is subjected to while
incarcerated, whatever treatment he receives from the officials charged with
administering his sentence, is the punishment the state has imposed." Dolovich,
supra note 82, at 899; cf. Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1158-60 (2013) (discussing the "different facilities challenge" to
achieving proportionality in punishment).
86. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994) ("Prison conditions may
be restrictive and even harsh, but gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one
prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objective, any more than it
squares with evolving standards of decency. Being violently assaulted in prison is
simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
87. Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43 U.S.F. L. REV.
87, 108 (2008) ("Prisons are also physically dangerous places in which to live."). The
Supreme Court accepted that "prisons are dangerous places" in considering whether
California's practice of racially segregating new prison inmates was constitutional.
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005). An opinion of judges on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted "the general knowledge that
prisons are dangerous places where rape and assault occur frequently." Riccardo v.
Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 536 (7th Cir. 2004) (Ripple, Rovner, Wood & Williams, JJ.,
dissenting).
88. See sources cited infra note 89. Juveniles and young adults are also likely to
find prison especially harsh because, like people with mental illnesses, they are
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"[s]omewhere between two and three hundred thousand men and
women in U.S. prisons suffer from mental disorders, including
such serious illnesses as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and
major depression. An estimated seventy thousand are psychotic
on any given day." 9  Since the mass closings of psychiatric
hospitals that began in the 1950s, 9' prisons have become our de
facto mental institutions. More people with mental illnesses are
in prison than in facilities specifically devoted to the treatment of
mental illness.91 The Los Angeles County Jail alone houses more
people with mental illnesses than any psychiatric treatment
facility in the country.92
Even though prisons are referred to as the "new psychiatric
institutions,"93 people with mental illnesses are likely to find
prison anything but therapeutic. Prison health care in general is
often barely adequate, and sometimes, it is so far below adequate
that it amounts to "cruel and unusual punishment"; prison
mental health care is often even worse.94 Additionally, people
likely to be ill-equipped to adapt to the demands of prison life.
89. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2003) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED],
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usalOO3/usalOO3.pdf; see also DORIS J.
JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006),
available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=PressSeptember_2006&
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=38175.
90. See ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO THE ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 346-47
(10th ed. 2005) ("Prior to 1950, effective drugs for treating psychotic patients were
virtually nonexistent, and psychotic patients were usually permanently or
semipermanently hospitalized; by 1955, more than half a million psychotic persons in
the United States were residing in mental hospitals. In 1956, a dramatic and steady
reversal in this trend began. By 1983, fewer than 220,000 were institutionalized.").
91. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 89, at 1 (reporting that
"[iun the United States, there are three times more mentally ill people in prisons
than in mental health hospitals").
92. MARVIN I. HERZ & STEPHEN R. MARDER, SCHIZOPHRENIA: COMPREHENSIVE
TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 275 (2002).
93. HEATHER BARR, CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y. & THE URBAN JUSTICE CTR., PRISONS
AND JAILS: HOSPITALS OF LAST RESORT: THE NEED FOR DIVERSION AND DISCHARGE
PLANNING FOR INCARCERATED PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN NEW YORK 6-7
(1999), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/MIReport.pdf.
94. According to a 2003 Human Rights Watch report:
[A]cross the nation, many prison mental health services are woefully deficient,
crippled by understaffing, insufficient facilities, and limited programs. All too
often seriously ill prisoners receive little or no meaningful treatment. They are
neglected, accused of malingering, treated as disciplinary problems.
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with mental illnesses lack the psychological resources to cope
with prison,95 and the prison environment can exacerbate mental
illnesses, resulting in a downward spiral of mental
deterioration.
96
On numerous occasions, courts have recognized that prison
conditions that cause or exacerbate serious mental illnesses are
inhumane. 7  "Segregated housing units," where mentally ill
prisoners are often placed because their psychiatric symptoms
make them unable to live safely in a general population, are
especially harmful.9 8 For example, one federal district court
judge observed: "[A]dministrative segregation units are virtual
incubators of psychoses-seeding illness in otherwise healthy
inmates and exacerbating illness in those already suffering from
mental infirmities."
99
In sum, much of how prisons operate in the United States
fails to respect the inherent human dignity of all people,
including those people who have committed even very serious
crimes. More specifically, from a Catholic perspective, these
Without the necessary care, mentally ill prisoners suffer painful symptoms
and their conditions can deteriorate. They are afflicted with delusions and
hallucinations, debilitating fears, extreme and uncontrollable mood swings.
They huddle silently in their cells, mumble incoherently, or yell incessantly.
They refuse to obey orders or lash out without apparent provocation. They beat
their heads against cell walls, smear themselves with feces, self-mutilate, and
commit suicide.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 89, at 1. In 2011, the U.S.
Supreme Court approved an unprecedented federal district court order mandating
that the State of California reduce its prison population because the overcrowded
conditions meant that inmates were deprived of basic physical and mental health
care. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
95. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 89, at 2 ('Mental illness
impairs prisoners' ability to cope with the extraordinary stresses of prison and to
follow the rules of a regimented life predicated on obedience and punishment for
infractions.").
96. People with mental illnesses are disproportionately placed in "segregated
housing units" (such as solitary confinement), an environment that can be even
worse for their mental state. See id. at 4, 14.
97. The likelihood that prison conditions will exacerbate an offender's mental
illness has caused some judges to impose a shorter prison sentence. See, e.g., United
States v. Boutot, 480 F. Supp. 2d 413, 421 (D. Me. 2007) (granting downward
departure); United States v. Roach, No. 00 CR 411, 2005 WL 2035653, at *6-8 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 22, 2005) (reducing sentence); United States v. Ribot, 97 F. Supp. 2d 74, 83-
84 (D. Mass. 1999) (granting downward departure).
98. See BARR, supra note 93, at 15; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra
note 89, at 4, 14.
99. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 907 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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prison conditions are inconsistent with the belief that all people
exist at all times in a relationship with God and with their fellow
human beings. As Pope John Paul II described, human life is "a
sacred reality entrusted to us, to be preserved with a sense of
responsibility and brought to perfection in love and in the gift of
ourselves to God and to our brothers and sisters.""1 ' Viewing
offenders, even those who have committed the most monstrous
crimes, not as monsters themselves but as human beings created
by and existing in a relationship with God reminds us that
although we should punish them for their crimes, we should
punish them in a manner that does not deny their inherent
human dignity.
III. REFORMATION AND REDEMPTION
In opposing the death penalty, Catholic thought has stressed
the inherent dignity of every human being. Respect for this
dignity should inform not only the limits of punishment, but also
the content. As Pope Benedict XVI counseled:
When conditions within jails and prisons are not conducive to
the process of regaining a sense of a worth and accepting its
related duties, these institutions fail to achieve one of their
essential ends. Public authorities must be ever vigilant in
this task, eschewing any means of punishment or correction
that either undermine or debase the human dignity of
prisoners.
10 1
Respect for the dignity of all people means that death is
100. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 1, 2.
101. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Twelfth World Congress of the
International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care (Sept. 6, 2007), available
at http://www.vatican.va/holy-fatherlbenedict xvi/speeches/2007/september/
documents/hfben-xvi_spe_20070906_pastorale-carcerariaen.html. Pope John Paul
II similarly said:
The Spirit of Christ, the Redeemer of the world, must breathe even where people
are chained in prisons according to the logic of a still necessary human justice.
Punishment cannot be reduced to mere retribution, much less take the form of
social retaliation or a sort of institutional vengeance. Punishment and
imprisonment have meaning if, while maintaining the demands of justice and
discouraging crime, they serve the rehabilitation of the individual by offering
those who have made a mistake an opportunity to reflect and to change their
lives in order to be fully reintegrated into society.
Pope John Paul II, Homily at "Regina Coeli" Prison in Rome during the Celebration
of the Great Jubilee (July 9, 2000), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/juohn-paul-ii/homilies/2000/documents/hfjp-ii-ho
m_20000709jubil-prisonersen.html.
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beyond the limits of acceptable punishments in today's society.
But saying that respect for the dignity of all people leaves
incarceration within the limits of acceptable punishments is only
the beginning of the inquiry about the relationship of human
dignity to the practice of criminal punishment. In particular, the
overarching question that we should be asking is: What does
respect for the dignity of all human beings require of a modern
system of punishment?
What would a system of punishment look like if it respected
the dignity of criminal offenders? 10 2 First, such a system would
not rely on imprisonment when equally effective, less
dehumanizing punishments are available, such as fines,
community service, house arrest, and electronic monitoring. 10 3 A
starting point might reserve imprisonment for offenders who
have committed violent crimes or who, for other reasons, pose a
danger if not confined."°4 Although a majority of people in state
and federal prisons have committed violent offenses, that
majority is a slim 53% which means that slightly less than half of
all people in prison in 2011 are nonviolent offenders. 10 5 In 2012,
voters in California approved a ballot measure that reserves the
punishment of life imprisonment for serious and violent
102. The U.S. Bishops assert that "any system of penal justice must provide those
necessities that enable inmates to live in dignity: food, clothing, shelter, personal
safety, timely medical care, education, and meaningful work adequate to the
conditions of human dignity." RESPONSIBILITY, REHABILITATION, AND RESTORATION,
supra note 10, at 21.
103. On the effectiveness of alternative punishments, see U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research-andStatistics/ResearchProjects/
Alternatives/20090206_Alternatives.pdf.
104. Reserving prison for the violent offenders has been proposed by many others.
See, e.g., Haney, supra note 87, at 97 n.23 (quoting statement of James Vorenberg,
executive director of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, "that only the very dangerous should be held in prison").
Vorenberg explained that decreased reliance on imprisonment, especially for non-
violent offenders, would benefit not only those in prison but society as a whole:
[Tihe Commission urged a shift from the use of prisons to community treatment
of offenders. Its reasoning can be simply summarized: if we take a person whose
criminal conduct shows he cannot manage his life, lock him up with others like
himself, increase his frustrations and anger, and take away from him any
responsibility for planning his life, he is almost certain to be more dangerous
when he gets out than when he went in.
Id. (alteration in original).
105. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 10 (2012), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pll.pdf.
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offenders.' 0 6  This vote is a ray of hope, suggesting that
electorates might no longer be responsive to the "get tough on
crime" political rhetoric that gave us "three strikes" laws and
mandatory minimum sentences.
A greater reliance on alternative sanctions would have both
direct and indirect benefits. 10 7  First, diminished reliance on
imprisonment would mean that some people would avoid the
dehumanizing conditions of prison altogether. Additionally,
because overcrowding is responsible for some of the
dehumanizing aspects of prisons, reducing prison populations
could naturally make prisons less dehumanizing places. 08 And
finally, the resources saved as a result of fewer prison inmates
could be spent on rehabilitating those people who are
imprisoned.'0 9
A more humane system of criminal punishments would also
mean that prison sentences would be shorter. Commentators on
present U.S. sentencing systems almost uniformly argue that
U.S. prison sentences are too long."0  A recent comparison of
106. See "Three Strikes Made Fairer," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, available at 2012
WLNR 23958339.
107. Although the focus of this Article is offenders, it should be noted that
decreasing the number of people sent to prison would have benefits for "the common
good" as well. Perhaps most importantly, prisons have been widely observed to be
"crimogenic"-that is, people who are sent to prison are more likely to commit a
crime upon release because of their experiences in prison. According to an interview
with one prison inmate: "'You come here for stealing a car, you leave here knowing
how to crack a safe .... This is a crime factory."' Blecker, supra note 83, at 1194.
For a recent, in-depth discussion of this issue, see Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison
Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049 (2008).
108. Nilsen, supra note 78, at 133 ("Prisons today may hold two to three times
their designated capacity, and such overcrowding severely affects all other prison
conditions. It drains resources and forces prisoners into closer contact than is
tolerable or healthy. Greater numbers force institutions to double- and triple-cell
inmates, thereby creating a host of health and security problems. It generates
neglect of individual needs, which correspondingly leads to a need for greater control
of the inmates, including long-term isolation." (footnote omitted)).
109. See Matthew G. Rowland, Too Many Going Back, Not Enough Getting Out?:
Supervision Violators, Probation Supervision, and Overcrowding in the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 77 FED. PROBATION, no. 2, Sept. 2013, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2013-09/too-many.
html ("There are examples where states have strategically shifted correctional
resources from prison to community corrections, reducing overall corrections costs
and crime.").
110. See, e.g., Nilsen, supra note 78, at 140; Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 4
(Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/
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prison sentences found that sentences in the U.S. are many times
longer than sentences imposed in other countries such as Britain
and France."' For example, under federal law in the United
States, "a judge must sentence a person convicted of possession of
a kilogram of heroin to at least 10 years. The same offender in
Britain would receive a maximum sentence of 6 months."'
1 2
With less need to operate from a position of crowd control,
prisons could re-embrace rehabilitation. Prisons in this country
were once thought of as places for spiritual reformation: "The
very names we give to American prisons illustrate their genesis
in the rehabilitative ideal. The term 'penitentiary' was coined by
Pennsylvania Quakers, who conceived of their prison regime of
confinement, work and prayer as conducive to penance and thus
to the reform of the offender.""13
If prisons are to be penitentiaries, they must be
environments that provide the basic preconditions necessary for
reformation. This means that prisons must not be certain
things-for example, overcrowded and violent. But it also means
that prisons must provide certain opportunities, such as
opportunities for meaningful activity like work or study. The
U.S. Bishops have objected to the death penalty on the grounds
that it denies offenders an opportunity for "moral growth in a
human life which has been seriously deformed.""' 4 Imprisonment
rather than execution preserves that possibility, but only in
theory unless the conditions of imprisonment change in a way
that fosters such growth rather than contributes to further
deformity. As Saint Augustine explained in recommending
imprisonment rather than execution as punishment for those who
had killed a Catholic priest:
We do not object to wicked men being deprived of their
freedom to do wrong, but we wish it to go just that far, so
that, without losing their life or being maimed in any part of
CR209800/newsletterpubs/JusticeKennedyABASpeechFinal.pdf.
111. CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & GLOBAL JUSTICE, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 17 (2012), available
at http://www.usfca.edu/law/clgj/criminalsentencing-pr/.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Frank 0. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other
Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV.
679, 685 n.20 (1996).
114. U.S. Bishops, Statement on Capital Punishment (Nov. 1980), available at
http://www.cctwincities.org/document.doc?id=90.
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their body, they may be restrained by the law from their mad
frenzy, guided into the way of peace and sanity, and assigned
to some useful work to replace their criminal activities.
115
Overcrowding has been blamed for the "drastically increased
levels of idleness that plague prisons around the country" and for
prisons' failures "to address even the most basic educational
needs of their prisoners."'116 Many commentators describe current
prison conditions as amounting to the "warehousing" of inmates-
the keeping of inventory rather than human beings.1" 7 Of course,
some critics of educational and other rehabilitative programs
complain that such programs are inconsistent with the purpose of
punishment, which is to make offenders suffer. For example, one
student writer asked: '"Why should society 'reward' convicted
felons for attacking innocent victims by providing the felons with
a free education?"'118
There is, of course, a practical answer to this question:
Rehabilitative programs can benefit society by decreasing
recidivism. But this is a contingent answer, dependent upon how
programs are administered and how their success is measured.
Even if it cannot be demonstrated that rehabilitative programs
succeed in decreasing recidivism, prison inmates ought to be
provided with educational and vocational training because
leaving them idle-warehousing them-is inhumane. As one
scholar has explained:
[T]he zoo-like confinement of idle inmates symbolizes that
they are undeserving of anything but daily survival, and in
many prisons not even that is assured .... [B]y
institutionalizing inmates in a manner that provides for
nothing more than their most elementary needs,
warehousing authorities are presenting them as "living
corpses"-as solely body and appetite and thus unworthy of
work or other activities that impart social value and self-
115. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 110 (2003)
(quoting Saint Augustine).
116. Haney, supra note 87, at 113.
117. See, e.g., id. ("Even in prison systems where per inmate expenditures were
high, overcrowding ensured that there was little to do. In essence, they warehoused
large numbers of prisoners for long periods of unproductive time, and made little or
no effort to address their pre-existing needs.").
118. Michael K. Greene, Note, "Show Me the Money!" Should Taxpayer Funds Be
Used to Educate Prisoners Under the Guise of Reducing Recidivism?, 24 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 173, 173-74 (1998).
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esteem-their only useful role being universal objects of
condemnation. 
119
Finally, a system of punishment that respected the dignity of
the human person would aim for repentance, redemption, and re-
integration. One of the most straightforward bases for opposing
the death penalty is that by killing the offender, the state takes
away the possibility of repentance. This was Saint Augustine's
argument: "[D]o not go so far as to kill the criminal, for in wishing
to punish the sin, you are destroying the man. Do not take away
his life; leave him the possibility of repentance. Do not kill so
that he can correct himself."120 A system of punishment that took
seriously the task of assisting the prison inmate in "correcting
himself'-of living up to the self-proclaimed identity as a
"Department of Correction"-would embrace as the ultimate goal
the return of the inmate to his family, his community, and society
at large. Penance, after all, is about restoring the sinner's
relationship not only with God, but also with the community.
Rehabilitation has been out of favor with legislators and the
public since at least the 1980s, when opinion started moving
towards a "tough on crime" stance. Many still see rehabilitation
as an unachievable ideal-criminals cannot be reformed. The
Church has a quite different view, based on its belief that no
person is beyond God's reach.
The Church's conception of redemption is of course distinctly
theological. It should not, however, be dismissed as irrelevant to
questions of secular punishment. As scholars of moral philosophy
have observed, the imposition of criminal punishment necessarily
says that the state regards the offender as a moral agent.
121
People whose actions cause even the greatest of social harms are
not punished as criminals if they are not morally responsible;
119. James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm
Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOus. L. REV. 1003, 1031-33 (1997); see also
Major Philip C. Mitchell, Federal Prison Industries: Ending Their Mandatory Source
Status, 83 MICH. B. J., Sept. 2004, at 20 ("Many contemporary prisons do little more
than warehouse their human residents by subjecting them to coerced and regimented
idleness.").
120. MEGIVERN, supra note 5, at 38 (quoting sermon cited in GUSTAVE COMBES, LA
DOCTRINE POLITIQUE DE SAINT AUGUSTINE 188-92 (1927)).
121. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 234-35 (1986); H. L. A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28-53 (1968); Peter Arenella, Convicting the
Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral
Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1609 (1992).
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young children and people with mental illnesses who do not
understand the nature of their acts, for example, cannot, be
convicted of a crime. 122 A precondition of imprisoning people is
that the state determines that they are moral agents; therefore,
the state ought to recognize an obligation to treat prisoners as
such, including regarding them as capable of making moral
decisions. 123 So long as prisoners possess the capacity to make
moral decisions, they possess the capacity to choose to reform
themselves. At its best, the state would enact a system of
punishment that actively seeks to promote reformation. At the
very least, the state should not create a system of punishment
that works against reformation or denies the capacity for
reformation.
In addition to addressing the problems already discussed-
reducing both overcrowding and warehousing and their attendant
dehumanizing consequences-a system of punishment that took
redemption and re-integration seriously would devote resources
to programs such as halfway houses that provide support for
offenders as they transition from imprisonment back into their
communities. The federal prison system explicitly provides for
the use of "community correction centers," yet only a very small
fraction of inmates-estimates range from 4 to 6 percent-have
been placed in such facilities.'
24
Finally, changes must be made to what are called "collateral
consequences" of criminal convictions-sanctions imposed by the
operation of non-criminal laws. These sanctions set up hurdles
that can keep the newly released inmate from becoming a full
member of society. One recent article presented this chronicle of
common collateral consequences of a felony conviction:
(a) ineligibility for state and federal licenses for certain
122. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152 (West 2002) (including among those
people who cannot be convicted of a crime children under the age of seven and those
people who are mentally ill or mentally retarded and who at the time of committing
the criminal act "were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness").
123. Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 208, 231 (1984) ("[T]he state's assumption that the people it is entitled to
punish are free means it must never regard any one it punishes as hopeless, insofar
as it is assuming that each of these persons still has the ability to choose to be
moral.").
124. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 7 app. tbl.2 (2011), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus1O.pdf.
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professions; (b) ineligibility for certain government jobs; (c)
ineligibility to vote in state or federal elections; (d)
ineligibility for public office; (e) ineligibility for jury service;
(g) ineligibility for public housing and other public welfare
benefits; (f) ineligibility for some educational loan or grant
benefits; (h) ineligibility for a driver's license; (j) sex offender
registration laws that limit where offender can live, in some
cases subjecting him to jail because he can't find a place to
live.'
25
Rather than working to ensure that those released from
prison transition successfully into their new lives, these burdens
all but ensure the opposite.
Collateral consequences can impose on former offenders a
kind of banishment or exile. Exile is inconsistent with regard for
the offender's humanity and is disfavored by Catholic teachings.
Punishment, as opposed to banishment, 126 accepts that the
offender is still part of the community. 127 But when the offender
has completed his sentence and is released, yet cannot vote, hold
a job, or find a place to live, then he has been effectively exiled.
He has been told: You are not part of our community; we do not
want you here.
The Catholic social teachings on exile have roots in the Old
Testament, which tells the story of the Jews' exile in Egypt.
From their own experience as outcasts, the Jews developed a
commitment to caring for the outcast,1 28 a commitment that
Catholics share. As one scholar has explained: "The Old
Testament imperative to care for the stranger, central as it was to
the ancient Jewish moral code, likewise became a foundational
125. Nilsen, supra note 78, at 137-38 (footnotes omitted).
126. Many former offenders have alleged that residency restrictions for sex
offenders are a form of banishment. Courts, however, have found that residency
restrictions are not banishment because they only prohibit offenders from living in
certain areas, not from being in those areas. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700,
719-20 (8th Cir. 2005); Bulles v. Hershman, No. Civ.A. 07-2889, 2009 WL 435337, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2009).
127. Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on
Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 752 (1992) ("We punish
offenders not because they stand outside of society, not because they are alien
enemies, but because they are fundamentally like the rest of us.").
128. Exodus 22:21 ("And a stranger shalt thou not wrong, neither shalt thou
oppress him; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.").
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element of the Christian-Catholic faith tradition."129  New
Testament teachings provide a further foundation for the
commitment to care for the outcast, because now "in the face of
the stranger, the Christian community encounters the face of
Jesus. 130
CONCLUSION
The Catholic Church has played an important role in the
debate about the death penalty, providing a strong moral
foundation for opposing a punishment that denies the inherent
human dignity of all people. The death penalty, though, is only
one of many ways that our practice of criminal punishment does
not respect the dignity of the human person. Excessively long
prison sentences, an over-reliance on imprisonment, prison
overcrowding, and the violence and idleness of the prison
experience all contribute to a prison system that is utterly
dehumanizing. Respect for the humanity of every person means
that these aspects of our criminal punishment system must be
changed.
129. Terry Coonan, There Are No Strangers Among Us: Catholic Social Teachings
and U.S. Immigration Law, 40 CATH. LAW. 105, 109 (2000).
130. Id. at 110-11.
